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ABSTRACT 
JEFFREY ALAN GERRING: A Decoupage of Violence: The Harmonization of 
Collective Violence Theories  
(Under the Direction of Dr. Robert Jenkins) 
 
 Multiple theories have been put forth attempting to explain why collective 
violence occurs in certain transitioning states and why it doesn’t in others.  To date, these 
theories have adequately explained why collective violence occurs in individual test 
cases, but have failed to provide a model that can be broadly applied to a variety of cases 
and to predict the probability of violence therein.  In this thesis I review current theories 
and combine different aspects of them in order to present a new ‘hybrid’ theoretical 
model of predicting the probability of collective violence in states that are transitioning to 
Democracy.  Each transitioning state will present its own set of unique challenges, but by 
understanding the basic framework and identifying common trends, it is possible to 
develop a loose model that will identify whether a state is at a high or low risk for 
collective violence.  By blending positive aspects of multiple specific theories, I will 
present a new compound model based on existing theories that will aid in identifying 
potential collective violence in the future, and hopefully assist in preventing it. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
May 13, 1990.  The Communists in Croatia had just been ousted from power, and 
Franjo Tudjman had just been elected as President of Croatia.  Yugoslavia was already on 
the brink of collapse, as Slovenia was on the verge of declaring independence from the 
federation.  Croatia was preparing to follow suit, and Serbians felt they were losing grip 
of an already critical situation.  An out of control economic crisis coupled with ethnic 
tensions between Serbs, Albanians, Muslims, Croats and Slovenes had brought a fragile 
nation to its boiling point. 
On May 13, 1990, Belgrade Red Star was set to play a soccer match against 
Dinamo Zagreb in the Croatian capital of Zagreb.  Approximately a half-hour before the 
start of the game clashes between Red Star fans and Dinamo fans erupted.  Accounts of 
how the violence began vary, but it is clear that Serbs tore down Croatian signs and 
Croats hurled rocks at the Serbs.  Some Serbian fans were even heard shouting “We will 
kill Tudjman!” (Sack & Suster, 2000, p. 311).  Helicopters, police, and anti-riot police 
moved in to disperse the crowds, but Croatians felt the response was slow and 
inadequate.  Additionally, they felt that the police, as an extension of the federal 
Yugoslav government, reacted more harshly to Croatian fans than Serbian fans (Sack & 
Suster, 2000).  At one point, Dinamo star player Zvonimir Boban came to the defense of 
a Croatian fan and attacked a federal police officer.  Seen as symbolically acting not just
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against a police officer, but instead as challenging the entire legitimacy of the Yugoslav 
federation, Boban was instantly revered as a hero (Sack & Suster, 2000).   
Throughout history, “the oppressed have struck out in the name of justice, the 
privileged in the name of order, [and] those in between in the name of fear” (Tilly, 1989, 
p. 62).1  Collective action in the form of violence has been a staple of nations in a state of 
transition for as long as there has been governance.  Scholars have taken up the cause of 
attempting to explain why collective violence occurs in some regions, while in other 
regions transition has been a relatively peaceful process.  In order to evaluate previous 
works, I will draw upon Monica Duffy Toft’s categorizations of theories into Material, 
Non-Material, and Elite Manipulation (Toft, 2003).  Evaluating these categorizations 
later in this paper, I will show that none of these on their own is sufficient in 
understanding why collective violence does or does not happen, but instead it is a 
combination of these existing theories that correctly predicts the likelihood of violence. 
Why is it that Slovenia was able to separate from the Yugoslav state in such a 
relatively peaceful manner when Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia were unable to avoid 
violence?    Toft, for example, uses her theory of indivisible territory (Toft, 2003) to 
explain why Chechnya experienced violence whereas Tartarstan did not,2 but it has fallen 
short in being able to be satisfactorily applied to many cases.  In addition to Toft’s theory 
of indivisible territory, other theories in her categorizations have been developed by 
                                                          
1
 Charles Tilly’s summation of collective violence from Violence in America provides an excellent 
summary of current theories on collective violence. 
 
2
 Monica Duffy Toft’s book, the Geography of Ethnic Violence explains her specific test cases well, but her 
theory of Indivisible Territory leaves much to be desired when applying it to the former Yugoslavia.  Her 
theory rests on the fact that there must be territory that is indivisible between two groups.  I argue that 
Serbia did not care so much about the territory of Croatia, but about Serbs living in certain areas of Croatia.  
For example, resources, or access to the coastline for security purposes did not factor into why violence 
occurred.  I argue that the actual territory, while it can be a causal factor, does not fit as a general theory. 
3 
 
scholars in such a narrow manner in order to be correct to their individual test cases that 
they gives us no real insight to what may happen to future states facing the threat of 
collective action. 
The alternative however, is finding common ground between multiple theories 
and developing a model that incorporates the best aspects of these various theories.  By 
understanding that each case will have its own anomalies, it is necessary to find broad 
underlying causal factors that potentially lead to collective violence.  By developing a 
broad theory that examines many different causal factors, we will be able to create a 
model that more accurately can be applied to a variety of cases. 
 
Defining Collective Violence 
The main theme of this thesis is to identify the causes of Collective Violence.  I 
begin by defining what exactly “Collective Violence” means.  Collective Violence is 
something that can be defined in a variety of ways, depending on the particular scholar’s 
goal.  For the purpose of this work, I am admittedly using the term Collective Violence 
quite broadly.  The World Health Organization defines Collective Violence as “the 
instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group – 
whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group 
or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic, or social objectives” (Krug, 
2002, p. 215).  This definition serves as a good starting point, but for the purpose of this 
work, I will refine my definition to meet four simple criteria which I will lay out later. 
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By collective violence, I am specifically referring to an act that is intended to 
inflict undeniable harm on an opposing political consciousness and that is executed in a 
fashion that leaves no mistake as to its political implications.  This harm can be aimed at 
property, people, or the economy.  It does not have to necessarily be ethnic, but must 
have some sort of political goal, and must be violent in nature.   
There are two key parts to the definition to which I intend to adhere – first is 
“collective”.  By collective, I am simply referring to a group of individuals that possess a 
shared identity.  This shared identity can be a variety of characteristics, be it sex, race, 
religion, income, or political ideology, to name a few.  This group does not need to be 
quantifiable in size, but must be widely recognized as a definable group.   By defining the 
collective in this manner, I am allowing for a wide range of group sizes but also limiting 
the groups utilized to those with a singular political consciousness and motivation.  In 
short, the act that is being carried out must have a pre-determined goal that is in lock-step 
with the group’s political motivations and ideologies. 
The second part of the definition refers to the actual violence.  The act, whether 
intended or not, must involve some sort of substantial (as viewed by the group that is 
being attacked) human death or injury toll, property damage, or a smaller incident 
designed to have large economic implications.  The viewpoint of the group on the 
receiving end of the act is essential – if the damage done is enough to either force a 
policy change, retaliation, or any other response, then it should be considered substantial 
enough to be considered violent.  With this in mind, it can also be noted that sometimes 
the simple threat of violence could be harmful enough to inflict economic damage, and 
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The bottom line in this definition is that four criteria must be met in any act in 
order to be classified as collective violence.  First, it must be politically motivated and 
have a definable goal.  Secondly, this goal must in keeping with the collective political or 
social ideology.  Third, the act must be executed by either a large population from the 
group, or by smaller numbers on behalf of the larger group that supports them.  Finally, 
the act must be violent in nature and be designed to take a toll on human life, property, 
economic stability or political institutions.  It is important to note that sometimes the 
simple threat of violence may have the same implications as actual violence, and as long 
as the threat meets these criteria, it can be included as a type of collective violence. 
 
Approaches 
Yugoslavia has been marred by violence throughout the twentieth century, not 
only during the First and Second World Wars, but also most notably during the 1990s as 
Socialist Yugoslavia disintegrated.  The violence that ensued in the 1990s has been 
widely studied, and many scholars have established theories as to why it was so violent.  
Causes ranging from established hatred between Serbs and Croats,3 to manipulation by 
diabolic, charismatic, and power hungry leaders,4 such as Slobodan Milosevic, to 
problems of mixed populations and ethnic homelands5 have been proposed.  Indeed, all 
                                                          
3
 Roger Petersen’s book Understanding Ethnic Violence theorizes that ethnic violence (which is simply a 
form of collective violence) is based upon emotions such as fear, hatred, resentment, and rage. 
 
4
 Michael Ignatieff  argues in Blood and Belonging: Journeys into New Nationalism that elites, or warlords 
as he calls them, are the key to violences. 
 
5
 Toft’s theory of Indivisible Territory relies heavily upon the concept that one group wants land, and the 
other refuses to give it up, which results in violence.  The reasoning of the squabbling for territory 
frequently centers around mixed populations and ethnic homelands. 
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of these theories have some weight to them, but I will show that none can stand on their 
own.   
The above attempts at explaining collective violence and why it occurs discuss 
only an aspect of collective violence rather than collective violence as a whole.  In 
reality, a combination of existing theories can more accurately and broadly predict 
collective violence, and can also be expressed in a quantifiable measure.  By examining 
the literature and applying it to my test cases of Slovenia, and Croatia,6 it will become 
evident that all theories provide some explanation, but can be weighted differently to 
determine the likelihood for violence.  I will put forth a simple representation that 
weights each of Toft’s categories (Material, Non-Material, and Elite Manipulation) 
differently, rate the target region on a scale similar to that of the Freedom House scores 
of democracy,7 and thus determine a state’s propensity for collective violence while in 
transition.   I hope to provide a new model to predict the likelihood for violence in 
transitioning states, such as Kosovo,8 based on what happened in the former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s.   
By transitioning states, I am referring to states that are undergoing a transition 
from any type of government that does not offer a freedom of choice to a democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6
 I have limited my test in this paper for several reasons – Slovenia and Croatia provide two very different 
examples, Slovenia giving an example of a largely non-violent secession and Croatia marred by extreme 
violence. 
 
7
 See the Freedom House website, http://www.freedomhouse.org.   
 
8
 Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008.  The majority of the international 
leaders of Europe and the US promptly recognized their independence, while Serbia declared it to be 
illegal.  Minor conflict has already taken place, such as the March 2008 seizing of a Mitrovica courthouse 
by Kosovo Serbs resulting in one death of a UN police officer.    
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government.  For example, my test cases of Slovenia and Croatia both cover a state that is 
in the process of transitioning from communism to democracy.  My model does not cover 
stable democratic states that are simply going through a normal, recurring election cycle.  
Nor does it cover states that have “rigged” elections in which there is no real choice in 
candidates.  The reason that I am limiting the scope of this project in this fashion is that 
these types of cases do not provide the same type of opportunity for elite manipulation as 
there is either no political opportunity for opposition, or because the government 
functions in such a stable manner that there are legal avenues for grievances to be 
resolved short of violence.  
The reason it has become so vital for us to understand why collective violence 
sometimes occurs in transitioning states and sometimes does not occur, lies with modern 
problem states such as Kosovo or even Iraq.  What can we learn from the violent breakup 
of a multi-national, ethnically intermixed Yugoslavia that can be applied to other multi-
national states undergoing transition today?  Despite the fact that the population of 
Kosovo is dominated by ethnic Albanians, the Serbs have viewed it as their mythical 
homeland since the arrival of the Turks in the 14th century (Gavrilovic, 2003).   With the 
recent declaration of independence by the Kosovo government and subsequent 
international support and Serbian outrage (BBC, 2008), the possibility for further ethnic 
and collective violence certainly exists.  By understanding why massive collective 
violence occurred in Croatia during the nineties, while relatively little occurred in 
Slovenia, and having a quantifiable method for predicting the probability of collective 
violence, we can hope to avoid the same disastrous outcome with Kosovo or any other 
state in transition.  
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Hypothesis 
 When I originally began to play with the idea of establishing a distinctive 
method of predicting collective violence, I found Toft’s summary of literature9 to be quite 
useful.  It should be noted right away that even by the title of her book, it is obvious that 
Toft is discussing her own and other theories of “ethnic violence,” not collective 
violence.  My decision to still use her categorizations is quite intentional.  Despite the 
fact that she is focusing on violence of an ethnic nature, ethnicity is simply one method of 
defining the boundaries of a group.  It does not matter if the collective group is bound by 
ethnicity, race, language, culture, or even imaginary borders – it still remains a collective 
group.  In the broader sense, we are referring to the same types of groups.   
Take an example of two very different groups – group A is an ethnically bound 
majority within a multi-ethnic state that desires to maintain the nation-state as its ruling 
majority.  Group B is a renegade anti-whaling group that desires to end what they 
perceive as the illegal hunting of whales and members share no ethnic identity with one 
another.  Group A, although it is the majority, lags economically.  Smaller ethnic groups 
desire to break away, thus threatening the majority’s ability to survive economically.  
Group B feels that illegal whaling directly threatens the ecosystem and endangers the 
delicate balance of life therein.  Both groups have a material concern – whether it is the 
economical status of the group or a dispute over resources.   
                                                          
9
 Toft’s book, The Geography of Ethnic Violence was the original basis of my work in this paper.  She 
categorizes current theories into three groups – Material, Non-material, and Elite Manipulation.  I have 
stayed within these major themes, but rather than utilizing non-material concerns, I will instead focus on 
the security dilemma. 
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Group A sees the renegade minority as a threat to the nation and their own 
stability. As the minority group moves towards independence, they began to gather arms 
to defend themselves from the majority which is seen as a direct physical threat to the 
majority.   Substantiated or not, the gathering of arms is a legitimate security concern.  
Group B feels that the whalers are violating international law protecting living creatures 
and wants to act on the animals behalf.  Their own security is not at stake, but they do 
feel that the security of a creature that is unable to protect itself is.  Both groups here have 
a non-material concern, which is specifically the existence of a security issue, either on 
Group A’s own members or the animals being protected by Group B. 
Group A sees the rise of a leader that will not tolerate the breakup of the mother 
state, and who utilizes divisive speeches to gather the people of the group behind him and 
motivate them towards violence by playing off of their fears.  Group B sees a sea captain 
that is seen as too militant by Greenpeace standards10 rise and lead them into action 
(McDonald, 2008).  Group A could easily describe the Serbians under the rise of 
Slobodan Milosevic in the early 1990’s, and group B represents the Sea Shepherds, a 
radical environmentalist group.  Both have political aims, arguably fanatical leaders, as 
well as material and non-material concerns.  Both are widely acknowledged as being 
notoriously violent groups.  The fact that one group has ethnic ties does not change the 
underlying factors that lead them to becoming violent. 
This brings us back to Toft and my reasoning for choosing her categorizations as 
the basis of my work.  She summarizes current literature and places it into the categories 
                                                          
10
 Greenpeace CEO Steve Shallon reported to the author of the original article that the Sea Shepherds level 
of militancy has created a backlash effect in Japan that is counterproductive to the work that Greenpeace is 
trying to do in support of anti-whaling groups. 
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of Material, Non-Material, and Elite Manipulation before putting forth her own theory of 
Indivisible Territory.  Her theory states that in order for ethnic violence to occur, the state 
must see the territory as indivisible and one ethnic group must demand independence 
(Toft, 2003).  Since I am more interested in the larger concept of collective violence 
however, I do not need to address a theory that is very specific in its definitions.  I feel 
that her theory does not, for example, adequately explain why Slovenia was not nearly as 
violent as Croatia was.   
Toft oversimplifies the Yugoslav problem, essentially reducing her argument that 
Serbia “had nothing to gain, but everything to lose” as a way of explaining the violence 
(Toft, 2003, p. 131).  It is true that the federal government saw the state as being 
indivisible, but this fact does not sufficiently explain why it was indivisible.  She explains 
Serbia’s attack on Slovenia as being a reaction to the fear that Croatia and Bosnia would 
follow suit.  She completely ignores elite manipulation in favor of Serb nationalism11 and 
the economic complications that would be presented in Serbia with the secession of 
Slovenia.  She instead reduces the problem to simply “territory” (Toft, 2003).  As we will 
see as we dissect the cases of Slovenia and Croatia, it is not that Serbia was overly 
concerned with the physical territory, but instead was concerned with maintaining the 
Yugoslav State, economically, militarily, and historically.  Territory certainly played a 
role in the Serb desire to maintain the Yugoslav state, but it was not the central theme as 
implied by Toft.  It is important to instead understand why the state was viewed as being 
indivisible, and what causal factors occur that actually led to each case of violence.  Her 
                                                          
11
 Toft argues that Nationalism has an independent effect to it, free of elite manipulation.  Nationalist 
rhetoric is highly ineffective however without some elite to spread the propaganda.  I do not believe that 
you can have nationalist fervor that leads to violence without the help of elite manipulators. 
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categorizations of other literature are an important part of her work however.  It is critical 
to define these three theoretical categorizations first prior to presenting my hypothesis. 
The first categorization is the world of Material Concerns.  Material theories are 
probably the weakest set of theories that are present and have been mostly abandoned by 
current scholars.  There is some indication that these theories do hold some weight.  As 
Susan Olzak noted in 1992, when ethnic inequalities and racially ordered systems break 
down, the risk of collective action increases (Olzak, 1992).12  Again, I will note, while 
this is an ethnic orientated theory, a connection can be made to any group with a 
collective consciousness.  The central theme behind this observation holds weight outside 
of the ethnic world.  If there is any system in place that favors one group over the other, 
and the disadvantaged group gets an opportunity to bridge the gap, the likelihood that one 
of the groups will take action to either speed or slow the process does increase.  Either the 
advantaged group will try and prevent the disadvantaged group from gaining ground and 
will use violence to keep them from gaining, or the disadvantaged group might try to use 
violence to force change.  Frequently when these systems break down, the disadvantaged 
gain an opportunity to take action and preexisting inequalities come to light.   
Non-Material theories are very important when determining the risk of collective 
violence.  These theories revolve around group identity, heritage, history, ancient hatred, 
and fear and security issues.  Roger Petersen gives a lot of weight to these types of 
theories in his book Understanding Ethnic Violence.  His theory is based around the idea 
                                                          
12
 What Olzak meant by this is that if group A is subordinate to Group B and has been for an extended 
period, there is usually no problem.  However, once these boundaries break down, the weaker group 
mobilizes to gain even more rights, and the stronger group may mobilize out of a desire to maintain the 
status quo and to keep the upper hand.  These boundaries can frequently be materially oriented, such as 
resources, jobs, income, etc. 
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that individual emotions are a key component of the likelihood of collective violence 
(Petersen, 2002).  William Rose also makes a security argument, building off of Barry 
Posen’s work.  Rose basically states that when a state breaks down, protection is no 
longer available, and each group is now responsible for determining who is friend and 
who is foe, as well as protecting themselves from these other groups.13   
Finally, Toft discusses the concept of Elite Manipulation, which is a critical 
component of understanding collective violence.  I define the elite as the leader of a 
group, or someone who has the ability to exercise overt influence over a group.  This can 
be a political party (frequently personified through its leader), a special interest group, 
intellectuals, academia, or even the media (when acting in a biased fashion).  Groups 
rarely organize themselves without some sort of political leader that is able to harness and 
bring critical issues to the forefront of the individual consciousness.  As Paul Brass 
pointed out in his book, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, non-
material theories hold some weight, as certain traits and cultural differences are present in 
groups; however these traits and beliefs are strategically exploited by elites for maximum 
political gain (Brass, 1991).  Jack Snyder also lends a great deal of support to Elite 
Manipulation theories, noting that Serbs and Croats had never fought each other until the 
twentieth century.  He has also observed that transitioning countries provide fertile 
breeding grounds for nationalist rhetoric (Snyder, 2000).   
With an understanding of the basic concepts of these groups of collective violence 
theories, it will be possible to show how their interrelationships can directly affect the 
                                                          
13
 Rose’s essay, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Some New Hypotheses” provides an 
excellent overview of current Security Dilemma literature.  He is primarily building off of Barry Posen’s 
essay, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, in Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47. 
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probability of collective violence.  I theorize that Material and Non-Material concerns 
alone have a greater effect on the probability of Collective Violence than does Elite 
Manipulation – until the three begin to interact.  Once the three begin to interact, Elite 
Manipulation has a greater effect on the likelihood of collective violence.   
Utilizing a scale from very low to imminent (see Table 1), we can represent a 
group’s (or state’s) likelihood for becoming violent.  By examining Table 2, we can see 
that the three groups of theories on their own have a low probability of violence.  Simply 
being economically disadvantaged, for example, rarely leads a group to violence.  
Examples can be seen regularly throughout history such as women in America who still 
earn less than their male counterparts for performing the same work.  According to the 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics as of 2000, women in the US earned only 72 cents to every 
dollar earned by a male (Levine, 2000).  However, despite some heavy political 
campaigning, this issue has been an ongoing struggle for years, free of violence.    
The same can be said for Elite Manipulation – if a senator were to stand in 
congress and call for Americans to take up arms against all Cocker Spaniels in an attempt 
to eradicate them from the earth, he would be quickly dismissed as a lunatic.  An extreme 
example, to be sure, but without some sort of logical basis of an argument, or some real 
inequality or fear to play upon, an elite attempting to manipulate the masses by himself is 
simply a raving loon.  It may be easy to think about a security issue leading to collective 
violence on its own, but has there ever been a case of collective violence without some 
sort of elite force manipulating the masses?  Maybe, on April 29, 1992, in Los Angeles, 
when the acquittal  of four LA Police Officers was announced in a case of excessive 
brutality against Rodney King (CNN, 2002).  However even as it seems that these riots 
14 
 
were a leaderless response to racial tensions in the US, I would argue that the real elite 
was the media involvement.  Typically, the media itself is not considered an elite force, 
but on some level it would seem that the glorification of the trial by news outlets certainly 
played a role in inciting anger in the masses.  Without a specific call to arms, the images 
were played over and over again, provoking the public into acting out.   
 
Table 1.  Probability of Violence Levels. 
Probability Level Definition 
Unlikely Very slim chance of sustained collective 
violence.  Possible Demonstrations, usually 
peaceful in nature. 
Possible Peaceful demonstrations may turn more 
political, with some collective violence that 
is most likely not sustained for long periods. 
Moderate Collective violence will occur in over 50% of 
cases, with increasing severity and duration 
of violence. 
Very High High likelihood of sustained, serious 
collective violence. 
Imminent Nearly certain to occur, multiple causal 
factors, all working in concert. 
  
 
 
Table 2.  Probability of Violence of Causal Factors witout Interaction. 
Causal Factor Probability Level  
Material Possible 
Non-Material Possible 
Elite Manipulation Unlikely 
  
 
  
CHAPTER 2 – REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Material Theories 
The material based theories are perhaps one of the weakest families of arguments 
for why collective violence happens.  Material theories essentially state that violence can 
erupt due to development and modernization that favors one group over another,  
deprivation of a group’s access to economic or political resources, or the value of 
territory (intrinsic, not strategic worth) (Toft, 2003).  As we will see, it is difficult to 
exclusively link material concerns consistently to collective violence, however they 
frequently lay the groundwork for a potentially volatile political situation. 
James Davies’ conception of the “J-Curve” (Figure 1) probably gives the best 
explanation of how material needs can lead to a violent result.14  In his chart, when both 
expectations and gratifications are rising together, even when they are not equal, citizens 
tend to be satisfied and will not rebel (Davies, 1979).  However, as expectations and 
gratification diverge from one another, the result is intolerable.  The divergence can 
manifest in several ways – if expectations continue to rise, but gratification levels off or 
declines, violence will become more likely.  Or perhaps expectations level off to a 
constant level, but the gratification decreases, then also violence will also be more likely.  
The key is the actual divergence between what the group expects and what it actually 
                                                          
14
 James Chowning Davies’ J-Curve can be found in his essay from the book Violence in America: 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives.  It defines the relationship between expectations and 
gratification. 
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sees. When this shift in the expectation-gratification relationship occurs, violence is 
likely the result.  However, as even Davies himself notes, this disparity is a necessary part 
of explaining the occurrence of violence, but it is not complete (Davies, 1979).  Elite 
manipulation is typically required to focus the individuals’ anger.   
 
Figure 1 
 
 Susan Olzak focuses on groups that are defined by racial and ethnic boundaries 
and, perhaps more importantly, what happens when certain material criteria within those 
boundaries are challenged.  Imagine a scenario where there are two groups and one group 
is more materially advantaged (better jobs, more income, more and better property, 
etc…) than the other group.  As long as the material wealth differential between these 
two groups remains constant, there is a low likelihood for collective violence.  However 
once the disadvantaged group gains more ground and erodes the established differential, 
there is a higher probability for violence (see figure 2).  Those on the bottom begin to see 
the potential for what they could have – that is what those above them already have – and 
now see an avenue to achieve that level of material gain.  Those in the top group see 
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those in the bottom gaining ground and begin to feel infringed upon (Olzak, 1992).  The 
lessening of the disparity of material rewards drives two real emotions – desire and fear.  
As I will later show, these individual emotions are powerful. Once an elite picks up on 
these emotions, they become easily exploitable and thus the call to mobilize towards 
violence increases.   
 
Figure 2 
 
 I argue however, that while material concerns such as differing economic 
opportunities or adequate amounts of food or water cause real concern for citizens, these 
concerns on their own do not produce a high likelihood of collective violence.  It is when 
elites pick up on these concerns and rally the group around the particular cause that the 
probability of violence rapidly increases.  Group rallying is evident when examining the 
Yugoslav cases of Slovenia and Croatia.  When the economic crisis of the 1980’s 
occurred in Yugoslavia, the Slovene desire was to continue to improve their economic 
situation by reorganizing the government so that they would not be held back any longer 
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by the poorer regions of Yugoslavia.  However, due to the redistribution fund15, this was 
impossible.  Although they had been contributing for decades, Slovenia began to feel as 
though their economic development was being stifled, which, according to Davies 
(Figure 3) and Olzak (Figure 4) would have led to increased collective violence.   
 
Figure 3 
 
 
Figure 4 
                                                          
15
 The redistribution fund was implemented in Yugoslavia in order to promote development in the poorer 
regions of the country.  Individual republics were required to pay varying amounts into the fund which was 
later redistributed to poorer regions.  Slovenia, being economically advantaged, paid the largest percentage 
into the fund, yet received back no assistance. 
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In order to determine when material grievances are present and to understand 
when they will play a role in determining collective violence, indicators must be 
established.  To determine whether or not material concerns exist between groups, 
economic data must be mined.  Indicators of economic inequalities may include a 
differential between two or more groups of pay, standard of living, or debt to income 
ratio.  Another indicator may be when an economically advantaged group’s position is 
degraded or their growth is stifled in order to assist a disadvantaged group.  These 
indicators may be seen simply within economic data and statistics, or grievances may be 
expressed individually via public opinion polls, riots, petitions, or protests. 
When applying a material based theory to the Yugoslav case it immediately seems 
as though material concerns have an inverse relationship with the probability of intense 
violence.  We will see that Slovenia’s main driving force behind their push for 
independence was economic concerns.  Slovenes, and also Croatians to a lesser extent, 
were not seeing their economic expectations being met in Tito’s quest for “brotherhood 
and unity” (Cuvalo, 1990).16  If the material based theories stood up on their own, then 
Slovenia would have seen more violence than Croatia did.   
Non-Material Theories 
Non-Material based theories run the gamut from being highly applicable to many 
cases, to some that are barely applicable at all.  The so-called Security Dilemma17 has 
                                                          
16
 See Ante Cuvalo’s The Croatian National Movement, 1966-1972, pp. 23.  Brotherhood and unity was a 
famous slogan used by Tito’s communist party to promote the idea that that all people within Yugoslavia’s 
borders were Yugoslavs first, despite their individual ethnicities. 
 
17
 Robert Jervis’s article “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” provides an excellent account of the 
details of the security dilemma theory.  I have drawn my analysis mainly from Charles Glaser’s article, 
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emerged as a highly important area of study that contributes significantly to the 
determination of the probability of collective violence.  Other theories such as the 
Ancient Hatred theories18 have proven to not only be difficult to observe and verify, but 
in many cases can be explained as elite manipulation.   
  Harold Isaacs has made some observations that lend some credibility to non-
material theories.19  Isaacs notes that individuals, whether they like it or not, have a 
defined group identity into which they are born.  Typically physical characteristics, given 
names, culture, language, and religion define individuals and place them into set groups 
with their own shared identity (Isaacs, 1975).  While this is true, these characteristics do 
not always lead to violence.  It is important to look at the group and determine how and 
by whom it is being defined.  Many citizens in Yugoslavia in the 1990’s did not classify 
themselves as Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes, but instead as Yugoslavs.  It was when elites 
got involved and forced citizens to classify themselves as members of one group or 
another that violence began to arise.  It is true that Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovars 
have all had been defined by their groups’ linguistic and ideological characteristics, and 
sometimes that has led to direct violence.  However, without other causal factors these 
differences rarely lead to violence. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“The Security Dilemma Revisted” (Glaser, 1997), which provides an excellent summary of Jervis’ work, 
and also adds his own take to it.  The security dilemma essentially states that as one group presents a threat 
to another groups security, the threatened group will take action in order to secure their position.  This 
action could be a physical preemptive attack or it could be the solidification of borders by increasing arms. 
 
18
 Harold Isaacs argues that there are preexisting groups that have predefined thoughts and ideas.  These 
predefined ideals may be hatred against another group for a past injustice (Isaacs, 1975). 
 
19
 Although Isaacs’ theory makes sense as a supporting cause, his theory of group identity leaves much to 
be desired to be a sole cause of the existence of collective violence. 
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 Jack Snyder has observed that not until the twentieth century have the Serbs and 
Croats fought each other (Snyder, 2000).  Their history had been a series of being defined 
by the ruler of the time, whether that was the Ottoman or Habsburg Empires.  The 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was founded after World War I on the basis that 
all were Slavs first and foremost.  Even under Tito’s Yugoslavia, there was a period of 
relative peace where citizens were Yugoslavs, not Croats, not Serbs, and not Slovenes.  It 
was not until elements of decentralization crept into the socialist system that expectations 
and reality began to diverge and eventually led to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.   
 The most powerful arguments that lend credibility to non-material theories are the 
security dilemma and emotional based theories, which are often intertwined and difficult 
to extrapolate from one another.  William Rose20 summarized the security dilemma by 
arguing that once a state begins to break down and groups no longer have official 
protection, they must then provide their own security.  While attempting to determine 
who is friend and who is foe, one group will inevitably act first, thus causing feelings of 
fear in the opposing group.  The second group will then in turn act on their fear, which 
begins a repeating cycle as society breaks out into excessive collective violence (Rose, 
2000).  A group that lacks security will feel exceptionally vulnerable, and this 
vulnerability can frequently lead to violent reactions to establish themselves as the 
stronger group.   
 Roger Petersen has argued that individual emotions are the key element when 
predicting the likelihood of collective violence (Petersen, 2002).  This argument is very 
                                                          
20
 Roses’ article builds off of Barry Posen’s work and adds a few new theories to it.  For the purpose of this 
article however, I refer to Rose mainly for his excellent summary of the current body of work present 
regarding the security dilemma. 
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similar to Davies’ J-Curve theory, which while material in nature, also lends a lot of 
weight to the importance of individual’s emotions.  Petersen even goes so far as to 
suggest that the “motivation to partake in and support ethnic violence is inherent in 
human nature” (Petersen, 2002, p. 1).  This idea is in keeping with the work of Charles 
Tilly who once wrote “collective violence is normal” (Tilly, 1989, p. 83).  Petersen’s 
argument, while neglecting the role of elite manipulation, does provide some excellent 
examples of non-material reasoning for citizens to mobilize into collective action.  Each 
of Petersen’s four emotions (Resentment, Fear, Hatred, and Rage) lends a different type 
of non-material reason for mobilization. 
 While Petersen attributes emotions as a cause of violence, I disagree on this point.  
I do agree however, that emotions play a vital role in collective violence, just not as 
causal factors.  As will be evident after examining the case studies later, emotions do not 
act as causal factors but instead as amplifiers.  Security Dilemmas, material complaints, 
and manipulative elites actually cause the violence, but intense emotions will frequently 
cause a violent situation to quickly become more volatile and dangerous. 
 Resentment is an emotion that is founded in the current situation and stems from 
the feeling that a political, not economic, relationship is unjust and that collective 
violence can actually solve the problem (Petersen, 2002).  This emotion tends to stem 
from a structural change that alters, or exaggerates, an existing group hierarchy in 
society.  One group will typically feel that they must try to control the situation before 
they lose any more ground, and will therefore lash out violently at the group that they feel 
can be controlled by violence.  This situation is an excellent example of what happened in 
Croatia – much of the Croats’ complaints were fueled by issues that stemmed from the 
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feeling that their language, history, and culture were being subordinated to that of the 
Serbs (Cuvalo, 1990).  As the Croats began to increase their political standing and move 
towards independence, the social/political order began to change, and the Serbs saw 
violence as the most reasonable method to not only control the Croats, but to also protect 
Serbs living inside of Croatian borders.   
 The second, and most powerful, emotion is that of Fear.  When structural changes 
cause the weakening of a political system (Petersen, 2002) individuals begin to fear for 
their own security and lash out at the group that represents the largest threat.  Fear is the 
one emotion that ties in very closely with the security dilemma, as the lack of security as 
well as a real or perceived threat of violence will lead a group to act preemptively.  
Petersen accurately classifies three types of fear that lead to collective violence.  The first 
case is when the population and elites have the same fears and act together.  The second 
case occurs when the population is manipulated by elites for their own gain.  Finally, the 
third case occurs when there is a power struggle between two elite factions (Petersen, 
2002).  It should be noted that fear is not necessarily a by-product of resentment.  Fear 
can be caused by a political shift or status reversal, a real or perceived security threat, or a 
variety of other factors.  As we will see in the case studies of Croatia and Slovenia, fear 
played very different roles in each republic.  How fear was exploited and used to 
mobilize individuals was critical in determining the levels of violence that took place.  
 The third emotion set forth by Petersen is that of Hatred (Petersen, 2002).  The 
basis of the theory of hatred is that structural changes provide an opportunity for 
retaliation from a previously violated group, and they now realize their underlying hatred 
and act out through collective action (Petersen, 2002).  This definition sounds very 
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similar to resentment, however the main difference is that resentment is based in current 
realities whereas hatred is based on pre-established historical realities.  Hatred in itself is 
generally not a rational reason to mobilize towards collective violence.  If it were, then 
there would not have been several decades of relative peace under Tito.  However, as the 
socio-political arena began to change, past atrocities, primarily from World War II, were 
invoked in order to mobilize citizens in the drive for independence. 
 The final emotion that Petersen discusses is Rage.  This emotion is typically an 
emotion that precedes cognition, and individuals act on pure emotion rather than 
information (Petersen, 2002).  Rage tends to manifest itself once violence is already 
underway against a group, which in turn results in irrational choices of targets.  While 
this type of violence certainly occurred in the Balkans during the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
its irrational nature as a by-product of other emotions and acts does not make it a 
legitimate causal factor.  Instead it can be classified as more of an outcome rather than 
stimulus. 
 It is evident in Yugoslavia that non-material factors tend to lend a great deal more 
weight to the prediction of collective action than do material factors.  It will be shown 
that both Croatian and Serbian leaders utilized rhetoric to promote fear and hatred 
between groups, and the evolving security dilemma in the region only exacerbated these 
emotions.  By contrast, the Slovenes did not focus on fear and hatred and as a result 
experienced far less violence.   
 Non-material concerns may be as readily apparent as material based concerns are, 
since there may not be hard data available to examine.  This is not to say that indicators 
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do not exist however.  One example of a non-material grievance that may be readily 
apparent is access to political tools and rights.  If there is one group that does not enjoy 
the same rights to voting access, public office, or other human rights, that may lead to 
violence.  Another example can be seen through historical interactions between two 
groups.  If two groups have had a history of conflict with one another, there is a potential 
for further violence.  This potential may be evident by observing the stockpiling of 
weapons.  Another method to observe the presence of non-material concerns could be as 
simple as observing interactions between groups on a daily basis.  Frequently emotions of 
anger or hatred against opposing groups are brought to light during events such as soccer 
matches.  How fans of one national team act verbally against opposing national teams 
may give real insight into deep seeded emotional viewpoints of potential conflict between 
groups.  Finally, just as with material concerns, protests, petitions, letters, and polls can 
indicate cultural grievances that are present. 
The essential point is that a state in transition always sees significant structural 
changes.  This change frequently leads to problems such as the creation of a security 
dilemma, which in turn can drive individual emotions of uncertainty and fear about the 
present and the future.  Some minor lashing out in the form of rage or hatred is bound to 
occur; however collective action on the scale of what happened in the Balkans does not 
lead to the amount of sustained collective violence that occurred in the 1990’s without 
some other factor, such as an elite manipulating the situation.  In Yugoslavia, structural 
change such as democratization and decentralization was the catalyst for action.  As 
decentralization occurred and Slovenia and Croatia attempted to alter the political 
landscape to benefit themselves, which in turn harmed the poorer republics, violence 
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began to break out.  As violence began to break out, emotions took over making it easier 
for elites to manipulate peoples fear and thus call them to action.  Emotion may not have 
been the cause of violence in Yugoslavia, but it was certainly a significant portion of the 
fuel that fed the fire.  Emotions can be viewed as amplifiers of violence rather than causal 
factors. 
Elite Manipulation Theories 
 Elite manipulation theory presents a double-edged sword.  Virtually anytime 
violence takes place on a massive scale, the world looks for someone to blame.  An 
individual  is almost always identified and held responsible, sometimes correctly and 
sometimes not.  When history looks back on grave atrocities such as the Nazi death 
camps or genocide in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, there has always been a figure head to 
blame.  Certainly leaders in these countries were guilty and in no way should be 
exonerated, but can one man even have enough power to wield over a population to carry 
out the amount of death that Pol Pot was responsible for?  And school history (outside of 
Serbia at least) still views Slobodan Milosevic as the ultimate manipulator in Yugoslavia, 
but the atrocities were certainly not carried out only by the Serbs. 
 Paul Brass argues that for elite manipulation to occur there must be a conflict 
between two groups over a system of beliefs (Brass, 1991).  Ethnic identity, he argues, is 
actually formed through a process of competition between elites, and this competition 
must take place within the boundaries determined by economic and political realities.  
There are real traits that members of the group share, whether they be physical, 
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economic, or a belief system, but these traits and beliefs are distorted by elites in order to 
achieve maximum political gain (Brass, 1991).   
 Michael Ignatieff links elite manipulation theory very closely to the security 
dilemma.  He argues that as nations disintegrate, ethnic civil war will occur fueled by the 
nationalist rhetoric of warlords.  This civil war is essentially a question of security.  The 
average citizen, when seeing his or her government break down, will undoubtedly ask the 
question of ‘Who will protect me?’  Ignatieff argues that when there is a lack of 
protection, the elite (or warlord as he refers to them) steps in to fill the void and offers 
protection by attacking the groups’ neighbors.  A sense of belonging and homeland with 
the manipulated group legitimizes the warlord in the citizen’s eyes (Ignatieff, 1993).  
 Jack Snyder sees elite manipulation as being manifested in the form of nationalist 
rhetoric.  Nations in a democratic transition period provide the most fertile ground for 
nationalist and ethnic conflict (Snyder, 2000, p. 20).  He argues that prior to the process 
of democratization nationalism will be weak amongst the masses.  However as 
democratization occurs and elites compete for popular support, nationalism becomes 
more evident.  This phenomenon can become intensified in countries that are poor and 
have either no or weak political institutions and parties in place (Snyder, 2000). 
 The above views on elite manipulation all capture aspects of how collective 
violence occurs, but none fully explains it.  Brass and Ignatieff agree on one point; that 
there must be some underlying factor in place for the elite to exploit for their own gain.  
This factor can be economic in nature, a desire for power, or it be can be a security issue.  
The common theme between their arguments however is that there must be a specific 
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issue to exploit.  If the chosen issue is not real, or is not accepted by the mass population 
as being real, then the elite will be unable to motivate groups into action.  If the 
population of the group accepts the rhetoric of the elite as being real however, motivation 
to action will come easier. 
 Snyder also accurately points out that nation-states with a weak political system 
or in transition possess the greatest ability to be subject to elite manipulation.  Countries 
beginning the process of democratization will look to emerging political leaders and 
rivals to bring important issues to light.  The mass population, looking for someone to 
guide them21 down the path of a better, safer, and more prosperous life will be more 
susceptible to manipulations that ultimately may lead to violence.  Depending on the 
underlying causal factors, whether they are material or security threats, elite manipulation 
can act as a force multiplier when determining the probability of collective violence. 
 Elite manipulation may in fact be the most difficult causal factor to observe and 
for which to establish concrete identifiers.  Generally however, by examining speeches 
given by political leaders, it is possible to determine what type of manipulation is taking 
place.  It is important to note that when discussing political figures, we are not 
determining whether or not the manipulation exists or not, but rather what type of 
manipulation it is and how effective it is.  The reasoning behind this is that no matter 
what issue a political leader uses as a platform, by using that issue and making a stand on 
it, the elite is in effect attempting to manipulate.  Whether or not he is successful or not 
                                                          
21
 This is not to indicate that the group is actively searching for a guide however.  There may be an 
underlying issue with which citizens are not happy.  When the elite brings the issue to light the people will 
accept him as their leader.  However, in the case of Yugoslavia, political change occurred at the onset of 
democratization, which included an election cycle.  Since the people were finally given a choice in their 
leader, in this case they actively sought out a leader with certain qualities – Slovenia chose a moderate 
reformer and Croatia chose a charismatic leader that focused on ethnic rights and differences. 
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must be determined separately.  The most readily apparent data in assessing the 
effectiveness of elite manipulation is in election data, and comparing issues that a party 
campaigns on against election results.  Another method is to compare elite rhetoric 
against issues that are used as the base for a rally or protest.  The elite may incite group 
members to act upon their issue of choice, or they may adapt to the issue with which the 
group at large is concerned with.  No matter how the elite begins the involvement, what 
must be examined is the effect that their involvement has on the issue. 
 In the case of a multi-national state such as Yugoslavia, a large part of the role of 
elites lies in the definition of the group because how the group is defined plays a pivotal 
role in what the issue is that the elite will choose to exploit.  In Slovenia for example, 
leaders chose to focus on economical issues, and defined their group through preexisting 
and historical borders that were unchallenged for the most part.  It is likely that since 
borders were more readily definable and unchallenged, that this caused the leaders to 
focus on economic issues vice ethnic issues.  In Croatia however, the borders were not as 
well defined and it was much more difficult to physically separate a Croatian group from 
a Serbian group.  Regions such as Krajina were intermixed, and leaders on both sides 
utilized fear and security issues to motivate individuals.  Tudjman for example focused 
not simply on creating a Croatian state, but specifically focused on being Croatian, and 
not Yugoslav.  By doing so, he alienated those whose roots were not Croatian and were 
living within Croatian borders, and in effect created a security dilemma.  How the group 
is defined, both by borders and by ideals is critical in determining how the group will 
behave.  
 
  
CHAPTER 3 – SYNTHESIZING THEORIES 
 
Melding Theories 
Laying out the three groups of theories (Material, Non-Material, and Elite 
Manipulation), we now have a base framework in which to examine a state’s likelihood 
for collective violence.  Table 3 represents the probability of collective violence between 
groups as causal factors interact.  Each combination of causal factors receives a 
probability rating as outlined in Table 1, ranging from little to no possibility of collective 
violence to a near certain probability of collective violence.  By examining specific cases 
and determining which types of factors are present, I hope to be able to accurately predict 
the probability of violence.  Since factors that lead to collective violence interact 
differently with one another, the values that are assigned to each case do not follow a 
readily apparent pattern.  However, each of the seven possible scores takes into 
consideration how the theories interact with one another and are individually explained 
below. 
Case 1: Elite Manipulation.  Elite manipulation by itself receives a rating of 
unlikely, which indicates that there is a very slim chance that collective violence will 
occur.  As discussed in Chapter 2, an elite that is attempting to mobilize or create a group 
based on an issue must either have a real problem to rally the group around or be able to 
coerce the group in believing that there is a cause for which to fight.  Without being able 
31 
 
to either play off of emotions, fear, or a security threat, or without being able to promise 
economic change in the form of a better economic position, an elite would have an 
extremely hard time generating real support for his cause.  It is important to note that 
violence is still possible in this scenario, but it is highly unlikely. 
Case 2: Material Concerns.  Material concerns alone receive a probability rating 
of possible, which means that there is an increased, although small chance of violence 
occurring.  Having a real cause to fight for or a specific goal in mind to achieve is a more 
effective tool for creating collective violence than a manipulative leader with no real 
cause is.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the change in a hierarchical economic relationship or 
the divergence of expectations and reality can cause collective action, and frequently a 
desire for reform.  Without a leader to focus this desire however, it is still not very likely 
that violence will be the result.  If the state in question is democratized for example, this 
type of issue will frequently wait for an election cycle in order to vote in a new leader to 
fix the problem.  One manner in which violence is still possible however is if a group’s 
expectations and reality diverge due to a specific event (a passing of a law that is not in 
the group’s best interest perhaps), a spontaneous protest could take place without the 
involvement of an elite.  The rally itself may not be violent, but there is the possibility 
that an angry mob without a leader could turn violent, as individuals within that group 
begin to feed off of one another’s emotion. 
Case 3: Non-Material Concerns.  Non-material concerns alone also receive a 
rating of possible.  The rationale behind this is essentially the same as for the second 
case.  Violence can certainly take place, but is less likely without an elite to focus the 
group’s energy.  However, the particular cause within the individual case will affect the 
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probability for violence.  For example, fear is more likely to cause a group to act than is 
hatred.  However if the fear is a security issue, the group will probably need to be well 
organized in order to successfully launch a preemptive strike, which typically requires the 
help of an elite. 
Case 4:Material and Non-Material Concerns.  Case 4 is the first time that there is 
an interaction of factors to consider.  Even though logic may want to lead us to assuming 
that the probability for collective violence will increase, I argue that this is not the case in 
this situation – the probability remains possible.  There are three ways that this type of 
situation may occur.  First, a political change may cause an economic shift that alters the 
relationship between two groups, and this economic shift may in turn cause resentment 
towards the other group.  Second, a status reversal in the socio-political order may result 
in fear and/or a security dilemma, which could in turn cause a shift in the way groups act 
economically towards each other, thereby causing the shift in the economic relationship.  
Third, two completely separate incidents could occur that cause an economic shift as well 
as a security dilemma, and these two incidents could be completely independent of each 
other.  Whichever situation occurs, without the assistance of elites to organize the groups 
and to focus their anger, violence remains only possible, not probable. 
Case 5: Elites Manipulating Material Concerns.  In this situation, we now have 
an elite who has a real issue to exploit and around which to rally his group.  There is 
already an established divergence of expectations and reality which causes concern for a 
group, and this elite will use rhetoric to present a possible solution to the problem.  
Whatever the motivation of the particular elite, whether it is a drive for independence for 
their state, better economic positioning for their group, or a selfish need for power, their 
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introduction into the problem begins to create an increasingly volatile situation.  The elite 
may actively attempt to get their group to move towards violence, or may try to alter the 
situation peacefully.  However, even an attempt at a peaceful resolution does not account 
for a key variable, how the opposing group responds.  This uncertainty increases the 
probability for collective violence, and therefore receives a rating of moderate. 
Case 6: Elites Manipulating Non-Material Concerns.  An elite actor that chooses 
to attempt to mobilize a group around a non-material issue creates an even more volatile 
situation than in case 5.  Since non-material issues center around emotions such as fear, 
hatred, resentment, or around the lack of security from a threatening neighbor, these 
issues are far more easily exploited by elites.  Material concerns can frequently be 
resolved peacefully and politically, or worsening economic position can be tolerated to an 
extent, but the fear that a member from another group wants to kill you is much more 
difficult to resolve peacefully.  A group that is dealing with a security dilemma, and that 
has a history of violence with the opposing group will more malleable and thereby more 
susceptible to violence.  Therefore I have rated this situation as having a very high 
probability of violence. 
Case 7: The Violent Trifecta.  Case 7 involves a situation where all three issues 
have taken root.  Perhaps a drastic political change is taking place that creates economic 
uncertainty and inequality between two groups that did not previously exist.  Couple this 
with a situation that creates fear and an elite force that draws on these issues, and the 
situation will likely be one that is not able to be resolved amicably.  This extremely 
volatile situation receives a rating of imminent, which indicates that collective violence is 
likely unavoidable.   
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As we begin to explore the individual cases of Slovenia and Croatia, I will show 
that the choice of Slovene elites to focus on material grievances permitted a far less 
violent outcome to occur than in Croatia, where elites (on both the Croat and Serb sides) 
focused on non-material grievances.  How groups were defined, central issues that were 
pressed as reasons for independence, and fear regarding how groups would treat each 
other were all key in determining how this dangerous game would be played. 
 
Table 3.  Interaction of Causal Factors and Associated Probabilities of Collective 
Violence. 
Causal Factor Probability Rating  
Elite Manipulation Only Unlikely 
Material Only Possible 
Non-Material Only Possible 
Material and Non-Material Possible 
Elite Manipulation and Non-Material Moderate 
Elite Manipulation and Material Very High 
Elite Manipulation, Non-Material AND Material Imminent 
  
 
Case Study: Slovenia 
 
 The break-up of Yugoslavia was a complex series of events, and no one cause can 
be solely attributed to it.  A disastrous economic downturn; the end of communism and 
the start of democratization; decentralization; charismatic and powerful leaders; and 
multiple competing interests between republics all played a role in the disintegration of a 
state as well as the massive collective violence that accompanied it.  Slovenia was the 
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most vocal of the republics in pushing for democratization and economic reform that 
would preserve their advantageous position in the SFRY.  Their economic complaints 
coupled with increased decentralization of the federal government certainly caused the 
push for independence, but what caused the violence, or comparative lack thereof?  
While Slovenia did experience some collective violence, they did not experience near the 
amounts of Croatia. 
 Since the formation of Yugoslavia following WWII, Slovenia always held an 
economically advantaged position to that of the rest of the republics.  Not only had 
Slovenia been more economically developed than the other republics, but their 
development as well as the disparity between them and the rest of Yugoslavia increased 
after World War II (Zizmond, 1992).  This disparity is illustrated in Table 4.  Slovenia 
only failed to receive the highest scores out of all years in one instance, which was 1955 
when Montenegro had a slightly higher investment per capita level. 
 
Table 4.  Development Levels of Yugoslav Republics (Yugoslav Average = 100) 
 Year BH MN M SER CRO SLO 
1.  Workers per 1955 88 90 79 85 119 171 
1000 inhabitants 1988 84 90 87 92 119 152 
2.  Investment  1955 97 197 93 81 97 183 
per capita 1987 73 76 47 95 111 221 
3.  Fixed assets 1955 101 35 51 73 121 233 
per capita 1987 82 122 51 79 130 203 
4.  GNP per capita 1955 83 77 68 86 122 175 
 1988 68 74 63 90 128 203 
        
Notes: BH – Bosnia and Hercegovina, MN – Montenegro, M – Macedonia, SER – Serbia, 
CRO – Croatia, SLO – Slovenia. 
Source: (Zizmond, 1992), original data from Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook, 1989 
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Slovenia throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s complained extensively of economic 
concerns that affected the republic.  Yugoslavia as a whole saw tough economic times 
throughout the 1980’s, particularly between May 1986 and January 1989, when Branko 
Mikulic led the federal government.  During that time, inflation grew from 90 percent to 
250 percent, GDP growth fell from 3.6 percent in 1986 to 0.3 percent in 1988, 
unemployment reached 20 percent (about 1.3 million), and foreign debt skyrocketed from 
2 billion to 23 billion US Dollars (Andrejevich, The Federal Government Resigns, 1989).  
While Slovenia only held 8 percent of the population of Yugoslavia within its borders in 
1986, it contributed 18 percent of Yugoslavia’s Gross National Product and was 
responsible for 23 percent of the national exports (Antic, 1989).22  Slovenia was also 
required during that time, according to 1987 data, to transfer 8 percent of its own GDP to 
the Federal Treasury and 1.5 percent of their GDP to the Federal Fund for 
Underdeveloped Regions, which equated to 25 percent of the entire Federal budget and 
18 percent of the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions (Antic, 1989).  This 
contribution of 18 percent of the Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions in 1986 was 
a marked increase from 1982, when Slovenia only contributed 12.7 percent (see Table 5) 
(Aleman & Treisman, 2005).  Despite contributing nearly one-fifth of the funds for 
underdeveloped regions in 1986, Slovenia received no money back for its own 
development (Antic, 1989).   
 
 
                                                          
22
 Data taken from Radio Free Europe Research.  Original data is from the Statistical Yearbook of 
Yugoslavia, 1987. 
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Table 5.  Participation in Federal Fund for Underdeveloped Regions by Republic 
(Percent of National Total). 
Republic Population 
     1980  
Contributions 
       1982 
   
Serbia      25.4        27.4 
Croatia      20.9        23.6 
Vojvodina        9.0        11.4 
Slovenia        8.2        12.7 
Bosnia-Herzegovina      18.6        15.1 
Macedonia        8.3          5.6 
Kosovo        7.0          1.9 
Montenegro        2.6          2.3 
Total      100        100 
Source: (Aleman & Treisman, 2005) 
 
Although it would be a natural inclination to assume that the group that claims 
economic issues to be a top concern to be the group that is disadvantaged, this was not 
the case in Slovenia.  The Slovene people felt as though they were being exploited by the 
Yugoslav federal government.  Public opinion polls in 1988 showed that nearly 60 
percent felt that Slovenia held too great of an economic association with the federation 
and the underdeveloped regions (Cohen, 1993).  The way that a typical Slovene saw the 
problem was that Slovenia provided the greatest amount of economic prosperity to 
Yugoslavia of any republic, yet benefited the least from it.   
 By November 1990, the Federal government in Yugoslavia had nearly 
completely collapsed economically.  Following the discovery that Milosevic’s 
government had essentially stolen 1.8 billion dollars from the federal treasury, Slovenia 
had declared it would no longer make any further tax payments (Ramet, 1996).  The 
Slovene government additionally announced that it “would not pay off its obligations to 
the army as long as there was a threat of the introduction of emergency measure” and that 
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they would reduce their contribution to the military budget to 3 billion dinars in 1991, 
down from 15 billion previously (Ramet, 1996, p. 46). 
 What can be seen from the economic crisis facing Slovenia is that the economy, 
in and of itself, did not cause collective violence to occur.  The economic data clearly 
shows that Slovenia was in an economically advantageous position as opposed to the rest 
of Yugoslavia.  Polling data also shows that citizens, as well as elites struggled to find a 
solution to the economic crisis.  Most Slovenes even preferred to remain within 
Yugoslavia, albeit in a confederal vice federal structure, but they did desire the economic 
freedom to remain in their preferred position.  However, it became increasingly clear to 
Slovenia that a confederal structure would not be possible and by November 1990 public 
opinion began to shift.  The Ljubljana daily paper, Delo, published a survey on 
November 17, 1990, that showed that 64.3 percent of Slovenes favored independence, 
and nearly 37 percent of the population cited economic inequalities as their top concern 
(RFE/RL, 1990).  By this time, the Slovenian government was preparing to hold a 
referendum on whether or not Slovenia should declare outright sovereignty from 
Yugoslavia.  The inability to repair the economy while remaining within a federal 
structure within Yugoslavia was what led to call for outright independence in June 1991.  
This is a clear example that demonstrates the fact that by looking at strictly economic 
concerns, collective violence is possible, but not probable.  There may be a high 
probability of collective action, in the form of a push towards independence, but it does 
not typically manifest itself in a violent nature.  Table 6 illustrates Slovenia’s economic 
position in relation to the probability for violence. 
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Table 6.  Slovenia’s Economic Grievances in Relation to Probability of Violence. 
Causal Factor Level  Examples Effect 
    
Material High High Level of 
Development, 
Contribution to 
Underdeveloped Fund, 
Polling Data Showing 
Desire for Reform 
Desire for 
Economic Reform 
While Remaining 
within Confederal 
Structure 
Probability Possible   
 
 
Despite the economic concerns collective violence was virtually avoided in 
Slovenia.  Until 1990, Slovenia remained controlled by the communist party.  The 
communist party struggled between a call for democratization by the Slovene people and 
the party’s urge to keep Slovenia communist.  The Slovenian President Janez Stanovnik 
even stated as late as 1989 that “we all more or less agree that Yugoslavia needs to be a 
socialist, democratic, federal state” and that the only real difference was how Slovenia “is 
in the domain of the state structure…and the way it functions” (Cohen, 1993, p. 60).   
The way in which Slovenia functioned within Yugoslavia became a major point 
of contention between Slovenia and the federal government, as well as the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA).  As part of the Slovene drive for reform, leaders began to support 
an increasingly liberal media.  This new found voice of Slovenia began openly attacking 
other republics, even calling the JNA a “foreign occupation force” and the communist 
party a hindrance to the development of Slovenia  (Antic, 1989).  By September 1989, the 
Slovene government had passed 54 constitutional amendments that included their right to 
self determination.  Additionally, amendment 63 was highly controversial; it stated that 
the Yugoslav Federal Government could not impose a state of emergency within Slovene 
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borders and that only the Slovene government could do so.  Vice Admiral Petar Simic 
immediately condemned this amendment, saying that it threatened the JNA’s ability to 
properly function and could “jeopardize the territorial integrity of the country” 
(Andrejevich, 1989).  It can be seen that after the economic groundwork was laid as a 
platform for reform between 1986 and 1989, the actual drive for democratization and 
reform began to create fear amongst key actors. 
By September 1990, Slovenia had passed three more constitutional amendments 
designed to strengthen their economic and political sovereignty.  One of the amendments 
even went as far as to transfer the Slovene territorial defense unit from the federal 
government to Slovene control.  This amendment could be seen in two very different 
lights:  On one hand, it shows that Slovenia must have been threatened by the Yugoslav 
Federal Government if they felt the need to assert control over arms in order to defend the 
Slovene Republic.  On the other hand, it can be seen as a direct offensive threat to the 
Yugoslav Federal Government, who must have felt that the secessionist republic of 
Slovenia had intentions of forcefully, rather than peacefully, withdrawing from the 
Federation.   The Yugoslav defense ministry immediately stated that it would not permit 
the creation of paramilitary units outside of the federal bounds and would take urgent 
steps to prevent the arming of individual republics (RFE/RL, 1990).  By October 5, 1990, 
the Yugoslav army sent a 16-man unit into Slovenia to reassert control over the territorial 
defense unit’s headquarters.  After they successfully regained control, over 200 protestors 
rallied outside of the building, and the Slovenian President immediately called the move a 
“provocation aimed at inciting armed conflict” (RFE/RL, 1990, p. 52).  This sequence of 
events indicates a real security dilemma that had been created between Yugoslavia and 
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Slovenia.  The Slovenes, in their drive towards independence, apparently felt the need to 
assert control over the means to protect themselves.  This move, just as Petersen would 
predict, was viewed as a direct threat by the Yugoslav government, which caused a 
retaliation to reassert control over the defense unit.   
By now, collective violence had begun to show its face in Slovenia.  While 
Slovenia did not experience much collective violence, this struggle over the control of the 
territorial defense unit certainly qualifies.  Although relatively mild, especially in 
comparison to the violence that would eventually take place, grappling over control of 
forces and mass protests were taking place.  It is also obvious however, that this instance 
of collective violence was not solely caused by non-material factors.  Army leaders that 
publicly decried the amendments, as well as the response by Slovene leaders intensified 
the situation.  This interaction between Non-Material (security) as well as Elite 
Manipulation causal factors would have led to a very high probability for violence to 
occur.  This relationship is illustrated in Table 7.  
Table 7.  Slovene Security Dilemma over Territorial Defense Unit. 
Causal Factor Level  Examples Effect 
    
Non-Material Moderate-
High 
Security Dilemma 
Created by Arming 
Yugoslav Reaction 
to Reassert Control 
Elite Manipulation Moderate Strong Language by JNA 
Leaders to Dissuade 
Slovenes from Arming 
Struggle to Regain 
Control of 
Headquarters, Mass 
Protests in 
Response 
Probability Very High   
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Holding its first multi-party elections in April 1990, Slovenia had the first 
opportunity to make its voice heard in the call for democratic change.  Two coalitions 
formed as the clear front-runners in the April elections.  The Democratic-United 
Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) was a seven party coalition consisting of a mixture of 
mainly traditional social and Christian democrats with a decisively agrarian and 
ecological platform.  DEMOS ran against the larger and better formed League of 
Communists, which was originally founded in 1937, but in February 1990 changed its 
name to the League of Communists of Slovenia – Party of Democratic Renewal (LCS-
PDR).  The LCS-PDR labeled itself as the party of real Democratic reform and advocated 
a gradual transformation into a Western European social democratic party, further 
decentralization, and a move towards a confederal system in Yugoslavia (Andrejevich, 
On the Eve of the Slovenian Elections, 1990).  Since both advocated a move towards a 
confederal system in Yugoslavia with further decentralization (the main differentiation 
between LCR-PDR and DEMOS), was that the DEMOS candidate, Joze Pucnik, was 
seen as far more radical, suggesting that a confederal system was simply a step towards 
Slovene independence (Andrejevich, Communist Wins Presidential Run-Off in Slovenia, 
1990).  The winner of the election, Milan Kucan, a former communist, represented a far 
more moderate platform than Pucnik (see Table 8 for election results).  This result clearly 
showed a desire for democratic reform in Slovenia, however not such radical reforms that 
would sever Slovenia from Yugoslavia completely.  This election slowed down the 
process of breaking away much more than would have been done if Pucnik had been 
elected, which likely resulted in less violence in the long run. 
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Table 8.  April 1990 Presidential election results in Slovenia. 
Party First Round 
Results  
Run-Off 
Results 
   
DEMOS (Pucnik) 26.6 % 41.7 percent 
LCS-PDR (Kucan) 44.4 percent 58.3 percent 
Independent 18.5 percent        -- 
Socialist Youth 10.5 percent        -- 
Total      83 percent 81 percent 
Source: Radio Free Europe research, 04 May, 1990 
 
When one usually thinks of elite manipulation in relation to collective violence, 
the image that is usually conjured up is that of a diabolical leader that leads his people 
into waging wars or carrying out genocide.  However, in the Slovene case, it was 
virtually the opposite.  Not only did the Slovene people opt for the far less radical 
presidential option in the 1990 elections, but Slovene leaders always saw it necessary to 
focus on the economic reasons to democratize.    
Take for example the events on December 1, 1989 in Ljubljana.  On that day, 
Serbian protestors planned on rallying in Ljubljana in order to demonstrate to the 
Slovenes the Serbian struggle in Kosovo.  The Slovene government wanted no part of the 
rally and immediately placed a ban on all public gatherings.  The rally was cancelled, 
with Serbian organizers claiming that they “did not want to be greeted with guns and 
truncheons” and Milosevic called for all people of Serbia and the institutions, businesses, 
and industries therein to break off ties with Slovenia because “basic human rights and 
freedoms have been suspended there” (Andrejevich, 1990, p. 20).23  Additionally, 
Milosevic blamed Slovenian leadership for having “aggressively, arrogantly, and 
                                                          
23
 Radio Free Europe 1990, volume 1, Number 3, 19 January 1990. 
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forcefully” broken ties with Serbia and having labeled Slovenia as the “last protector of 
conservatism in Yugoslavia and in socialist countries in general.”  He also supported the 
call to sever all ties with Slovenia, saying “we will stand by our reaction until the forces 
of conservatism, aggression, and despotism have stepped down from the Slovenian 
political scene” (Andrejevich, Worsening Relations Between Serbia and Slovenia, 1990, 
p. 22).24   
Slovenian leaders on the other hand, utilized less harsh rhetoric regarding the 
Serbian rally.  Whereas Milosevic called for action against Slovenia, Slovene leaders 
used their rhetoric to raise awareness on violations against their sovereignty.  Janez 
Drnovsek, the state president, called the meeting an “attack on the constitutional order of 
Yugoslavia and Slovenia’s sovereignty” (Andrejevich, Worsening Relations Between 
Serbia and Slovenia, 1990, p. 21).25  The political rhetoric coming from Croatian leaders 
echoed the tone used by the Slovenes.  Croatian state president Ivo Latin remarked that 
“instead of democratic dialogue, the Serbian leadership is offering us a one-sided 
nationalistic program…and we cannot accept this” (Andrejevich, Worsening Relations 
Between Serbia and Slovenia, 1990, p. 21).26  The type of language utilized by Slovenia 
and their supporters was far more mild than that of their Serbian counterparts.  It is 
evident that the types of language used by elites, as well as the issue they choose to rally 
citizens around plays a critical role in determining the levels of potential collective 
violence. 
                                                          
24
 Ibid.  Quoted from acceptance speech on December 5, 1989, as reported in Politika, Belgrade, 6 
December, 1989. 
 
25
 Radio Free Europe 1990, volume 1, Number 3, 19 January 1990. 
 
26
 Radio Free Europe 1990, volume 1, Number 3, 19 January 1990. 
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While this may only be one instance, the type of language used is critical.  
Slovene elites utilized language that indicated that they wanted peace and sovereignty in 
Slovenia and for Slovene leaders to be able to refrain from nationalistic rhetoric that was 
taking place elsewhere in Yugoslavia, such as Kosovo.  Serbian leaders on the other 
hand, began to move away from rhetoric that made the rally a Yugoslav issue and instead 
called for harmful action against the Slovene republic.  Not only did Milosevic call for 
action against Slovenia, but he also did not make the call to all Yugoslavs.  Instead, he 
rallied specifically the Serbs to break off ties with the Slovenes.  This type of language is 
what began to move the Slovenian desire from economic reform throughout Yugoslavia 
into a semi-nationalistic dispute between Serbs and Slovenes.  Slovene elites were very 
careful in their language to maintain their stand as one for a push for Yugoslav reform, 
and did not specifically call out Serbs. 
Looking at the entirety of the Slovenian case, we can determine which factors 
were present and how they affected the amount of violence that occurred (see Table 9).  
Slovenia experienced high amounts of economic unrest, which laid the framework for a 
reform minded democratization process.  Less radical elites that were elected focused 
their agenda on economic reform rather than nationalistic rhetoric, making the move 
towards independence less violent.  Violence that was experienced was conducted in the 
name of maintaining Yugoslavia and was framed in nationalistic rhetoric by Serbian 
leaders as well as the JNA.   
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Table 9.  Interaction of Causal Factors in Slovenian Case. 
Causal Factor Level  Example Effect 
    
Material High Underdeveloped Fund, 
Development Levels 
Desire for Reform, 
Independence 
Non-Material Low Fight for Control of 
Forces 
Minor Violence 
Elite Manipulation Moderate Banning of Rally, 
Constitutional 
Amendments 
Hastening of 
Independence, Less 
Radical Elites 
Elected  
Overall Moderate 10 Day War, Minor 
Conflicts 
Independence, 
Democratization 
 
Overall, Slovenia was able to nearly avoid collective violence in their secession 
from Yugoslavia.  The few cases that did take place were relatively small incidents that 
were linked to non-material factors that were exacerbated by intense elite rhetoric.  The 
main violence that occurred in Slovenia was during the 10-day war following their 
declaration of independence from Yugoslavia.  The violence experienced in the war was 
more of a by-product of military mobilization into Slovenia following their declaration of 
independence.  The 10-day war in Slovenia was as brief as it sounds.  In fact, casualties 
were limited to 44 JNA troops and “a handful of Slovenes” (Judah, 2000, p. 178).  Table 
9 illustrates the probability of violence, both on the Slovene and the Serbian sides.  
Taking into account all three of the causal factors (high level of Material concerns, Low 
level of Non-Material concerns, and a Moderate level of Elite Manipulation), Slovenia 
receives a probability rating of Moderate.    
Slovenia’s Moderate rating is attributed to the fact that there was a solid 
foundation of material grievance which led to a drive towards reform.  Elite’s 
consequently focused on these material concerns and shied away from becoming 
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nationalistic in their language.  Despite a few isolated cases of violence, there was a 
rather weak base of non-material concerns.  Slovenia and Serbia did not have as violent 
of as past as the Serbs and Croats did, and the only real sustained security threat that 
occurred was after independence when the Yugoslav army mobilized.  In a reaction to the 
attack, Slovenes defended themselves.  According to my definition of collective violence, 
to be classified as violent an act must have the intent of inflicting undeniable harm on an 
opposing group.  While Slovenia’s push for reform and eventual independence did cause 
harm economically to Yugoslavia, the intent was not to harm but instead to strengthen 
their own position. 
While Serbia was not the focus of my case study, their actions did play a role in 
the occurrence of the 10-Day War, and I would score them with a rating of Imminent.  
This rating is due to the fact that Serbia took action economically with the direct intent of 
inflicting harm on them, such as charging duties on goods imported from Slovenia and 
Croatia as an attempt to protect Serbia from “disloyal domestic and foreign competition” 
(RFE/RL, 1990, p. 52).    Additionally, Milosevic routinely utilized language that framed 
the dispute not in economic terms, but in ethnic terms.  By utilizing this divisive speech, 
Milosevic managed to alter the nature of the dispute from on which was Slovene against 
Yugoslav to one that was framed in terms of Slovene versus Serb.  This created ethnic 
tension, and helped to perpetuate a security dilemma.  The combination of divisive 
nationalistic rhetoric, intent to inflict economic harm, and the framing of Slovenes as 
secessionist and as being against the Yugoslav state made the Serbian score rise to 
Imminent.  This score proved to be accurate as the call for ceased economic relations, 
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duties on goods, and unwillingness to work towards a solution drove the Slovenes to 
declare independence, thus in effect causing the army to invade. 
The Slovene case also holds true as they did not act violently as a group until they 
were forced to defend themselves against the mobilization of the JNA.  In keeping with 
my definition of collective violence, Slovenia, while they did push for reform, did not act 
with the intent to harm another group.  Rather, their actions were designed with the intent 
to remain a part of Yugoslavia, while improving their economic position.  Serbia on the 
other hand, not only acted forcefully in their attempt to keep Slovenia a part of 
Yugoslavia, but also attempted to inflict economic harm on Slovenia by cutting off trade 
relations with them when they felt slighted.   
 
Case Study: Croatia 
 About the same time as Slovenia began seriously pushing for independence, 
Croatia began to also become more vocal that they too would not stand to be a part of the 
current form of Yugoslavia.  Perhaps the Croats saw the conflict in Slovenia as their 
catalyst for action and hoped that Croatia could follow the same path, or perhaps Croat 
leaders hoped that a distracted Yugoslav government would allow Croatians to finally 
realize their dream of an independent state.  No matter cause, the circumstances 
surrounding the Croatian case would prove to be vastly different and more deadly than 
the Slovene case. 
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 Peterson gives a good summary of the cause of conflict in Yugoslavia, and how a 
combination of economic issues, security fears, and manipulative elites can create a 
volatile situation: 
“Yugoslavians lived peacefully for decades…Ethnic problems and ethnic consciousness 
faded with the onset of modernity.  Then economic problems, exacerbated by excessive 
borrowing…emerged to destroy the system’s equilibrium.  Furthermore, the breakdown 
of the Soviet System, the collapse of Communism throughout Eastern Europe, and the 
end of the cold war removed the ideological underpinnings and rationale of continued 
one-party rule.  Communist elites needed to find a new justification for power – 
nationalism was the most effective choice.  Using their control of the media…elites 
dredged up bloody histories and told lies in an effort to permeate their constituencies with 
fear.  This fear, due to the dynamics of the Security Dilemma, became self-fulfilling.  
With all groups organizing and arming, prudence and lack of credible commitments 
created the incentives for preemptive strikes.  In essence, individuals were motivated to 
participate in the Elite’s program by fear.” (Petersen, 2002, pp. 210-211) 
 
 Without delving deeply into Yugoslav history, and utilizing Petersen’s summary 
above, we can see certain trends in the Croatian case.  Similar to Slovenia, Croatia has 
always been more economically prosperous than neighboring Serbia.  As we saw with 
Slovenia in Table 1, economic data also shows that Croatia was essentially the second 
most economically prosperous republic, just behind Slovenia.  Similarly to Slovenia, 
Croatia provided 31 percent of the federal funding to the underdeveloped regions, but 
only received back 18 percent, whereas Serbia provided only 29 percent but received a 
staggering 68 percent (Antic, 1989).  Additionally, Croatia was the main supplier of hard 
currency in the form of tourism, industrial exports, and money from workers who had 
emigrated to the west.  Thus, they contributed over 50 percent of the hard currency in 
Yugoslavia, but only controlled 9.7 percent in their banks.  Belgrade in turn controlled 
81.3 percent (Cuvalo, 1990).  These concerns, just as they were in Slovenia, provided a 
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framework for a desire for reform, democratization, and decentralization.  However, we 
will see that elites in Croatia chose not to articulate these economic problems and instead 
focused on a more deadly concoction of nationalist rhetoric, fear, and ancient hatreds and 
rights. 
 By late 1989, the failing economy was a top concern for many citizens of 
Yugoslavia.  Tanjug Domestic Service from Belgrade reported in October 1989 that 
between January and August, there were 1,194 strikes involving nearly a quarter-million 
workers.  During that time, Croatia had more strikes than any other republic, with 394.  
These strikes were noted as being caused by economic strife, extreme inflation, and poor 
work conditions and pay (FBIS, October 06, 1989).27  By the end of 1989, BORBA, a 
newspaper based in Belgrade, reported that the total number of strikes had reached 1,900, 
and noted that the strikes were becoming increasingly specific in their demands and much 
more organized (FBIS, January 18, 1990). 
Once again, similar to the Slovene case, it is evident that strictly economic 
concerns only make collective violence possible, not probable (see Table 10).  Economic 
disaster had affected all of Yugoslavia, however the economically advantaged positions 
of Slovenia and Croatia caused them to push harder for reform and democratization that 
other republics.  However, just as happened in Slovenia, economic grievances did not 
turn violent in Croatia.  Instead, these concerns led to strikes, protests, and the ouster of 
the communist party. 
  
                                                          
27
 These strikes were counted by classification, and did not include 181 strikes that took place in Kosovo, as 
those were classified as being of a political nature. 
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Table 10.  Croatia’s Probability for Violence based on Material Factors. 
Causal Factor Level  Examples Effect 
    
Material Moderate to 
High 
High Level of 
Development, 
Contribution to 
Underdeveloped Fund, 
Poor Work Conditions 
and Pay 
Desire for 
Economic Reform, 
Multiple Peaceful 
Strikes and 
Demonstrations 
Probability Possible   
 
 If Slovenia and Croatia were in the same sinking economical ship together, then 
why did Croatia experience so much more collective violence?  In the Croatian case, 
while economic reform laid the groundwork for democratization, non-material issues as 
well as the decision of leaders to beat the nationalistic drum caused a much more 
complex situation.   
Following the Brioni Plenum of 1966, the central government began to loosen 
controls on the republics and allowed more nationalist talk.  What would become known 
as the Croatian Spring began to unfold, which was essentially a revival of Croatian 
culture in Yugoslavia.  Primary grievances were associated with the use of language, as 
Croat reformers wanted a separate Croatian language, vice the current Serbo-Croatian 
that was used.  The Croatian Literary Society published an article in 1969, which laid out 
cultural grievances against the Serbs (Ramet, 1992, p. 106): 
 1.  Croats are treated as illegal residents in their own country. 
2.  Croatian interests are subordinate to Serbian interests. 
3.  To feel Croatian under current circumstances is worthy of pity. 
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4.  To lose one’s language is to lose one’s identity.28 
5.  The Croatian Nation has, by various nefarious means, been portrayed as 
criminal.29 
6.  Croatia is still being equated with the Ustashe. 
7.  Belgrade is attempting to Serbianize Croatia. 
8.  Croatia has become a “no-mans land”. 
9.  Croatia has lost everything essential to the preservation of its culture. 
10.  The Serbs have a definite movement to assimilate Croatian youth and cause 
the Croatian nation to disappear without a trace. 
 
Tito would eventually crack down on Croatian reformers, but following his death in 1980 
and the subsequent further collapse of the Yugoslav economy, Croatian elites were once 
again able to bring these issues back to the forefront of the Croatian consciousness.  By 
the late 1980’s “nationalism burst from its hiding places and swept people by the 
hundreds of thousands into mass movements, then elections, then into confrontations that 
escalated…to civil war” (Denich, 1994, p. 367). 
 The lead up to the April 1990 election was a pivotal point for Croatia and for 
deciding how they would move forward towards independence.  In December 1989, the 
11th party of congress of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) convened to 
discuss reform, multiparty elections, the establishment of a market economy, and the end 
of centralism.  Nationalist tensions began to crop up in Croatia in 1989 as well.  Rallies 
by Serbs living within Croatian borders were labeled as a “display of militant 
                                                          
28
 This is a reference to the official dictionary of Yugoslavia, which contained no Croatian variants of 
words, only the Serbian variants. 
 
29
 Serbian nationalists equated the Croatian Nationalists with the Ustashe frequently. 
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nationalism” and Croatian leaders called Milosevic’s policies “populist, neo-Stalinist, 
anti-Yugoslav, or fascist” (Andrejevich, Croatia: Reform and Tension, 1990, p. 33).  The 
Belgrade weekly, NIN, published a cover story in December 1989, following the 11th 
congress, asking if the congress represented “the Maspok [Croatian National Movement] 
of 1971 all over again”30 and stated that “the foundations of the Maspok Movement have 
been completed” and that it was a sort of “Prague Spring – an anti-communist, socialist, 
liberal people’s movement” (Andrejevich, Croatia: Reform and Tension, 1990, p. 36). 
 In January 1990, Franjo Tudjman made a speech at the founding convention of 
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party, in which he established the party’s goal of 
statehood based on Croatia’s historical right.  Additionally, Tudjman pressed that the new 
Croatian state should have the same boundaries as the Croatian state of WWII (when the 
Ustasha was in power) and noted that the WWII state of Croatia was “an expression of 
the historical aspiration of the Croatian people for its own independent state” (Denich, 
1994, p. 377).  By comparing the formation of a new state to that of the former fascist 
state of Croatia, Tudjman and his party “reaffirmed its continuity with that history” 
(Denich, 1994, p. 377). 
The first multiparty election in Croatia was set for April 22, two weeks following 
Slovenia’s election.  In Croatia, voters elect members of the Sabor, or National 
Assembly, who in turn elect the state president.  The main parties that campaigned for 
seats in the Sabor were: The Croatian Democratic Bloc, whose president was Franjo 
Tudjman, whose platform was to create a confederation and respect the rights of Serbs 
living within Croatian borders; the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), also headed 
                                                          
30
 The “Maspok” is another term frequently used to describe the Croatian Spring of 1970-1971. 
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by Franjo Tudjman, whose platform was advocating Croatia’s right to secession from 
Yugoslavia, Croatian national sovereignty, free elections, a free market economy, and 
integration into the European community; the Coalition of National Accord, led by five 
former communists who were purged by Tito for their involvement in the Croatian 
Spring, who advocated a multiparty and parliamentary democracy, a confederation within 
Yugoslavia, the right of all republics to secede, and bitterly opposed an increase of the 
federal government’s power over economic affairs; and the League of Communists of 
Croatia – Party of Democratic Change (LCC-PDC), who called for a western style 
political democracy, democratic socialism, a market economy, support of a federated 
Yugoslavia and a move towards modern socialist and European movements, and was led 
by Ivica Racan (Andrejevich, Croatia Goes to the Polls, 1990). 
 The campaign trail was marred with violence and intense rhetoric, particularly 
between the HDZ and ethnic Serbs within Croatia and Bosnia.  Most of the tensions were 
created due to the association (true or not) that Serbs made between the HDZ and the 
Ustasha, a pro-axis security apparatus during WWII that targeted Serbians, Moslems, and 
Gypsies.  Serbs living within Croatian borders for example, felt excluded nearly 
immediately, as campaign poster throughout Croatia were emblazoned with Tudjman’s 
portrait and the slogan “we alone will decide Croatia’s fate” (Denich, 1994, p. 379).  The 
army weekly Narodna Armija wrote that the HDZ recruited “pro-fascists and 
chauvinists” into its ranks and accused the HDZ of “closely cooperating with Ustasha 
émigré groups.”  The Skopje daily paper Nova Makedonija wrote that the CDC 
“provoked justified fears throughout the country with its messages of political darkness, 
which represents the resurrection of Nazism and the ideas of the Ustasha,” and that 
55 
 
Tudjman caused both “euphoria and fear” (Andrejevich, Croatia Goes to the Polls, 1990, 
p. 36).  On March 18, a 57 year old Serb, Sava Cubrilovic, attempted to assassinate 
Tudjman at a rally but was stopped by his bodyguards.  Serbian activists accused 
Tudjman of staging the event, and claimed to have evidence proving that Serbs had 
nothing to do with the event, but that the Zagreb and Split media “turned their backs on 
us” (Andrejevich, Croatia Goes to the Polls, 1990, p. 36). 
 Despite, or perhaps because of, the ethnic tensions rapidly becoming the issue of 
the day during the election season, the HDZ, led by Franjo Tudjman won an 
overwhelming 104 of 131 seats of the Sabor, with the LCC-PDC winning 13 seats and 
the Coalition for National Accord won 3 seats (RFE/RL, Weekly Record of Events, 
1990).  In contrast to the elections in Slovenia, the Croatian voters rallied strongly behind 
the more radical party and the only coalition that favored outright independence from 
Yugoslavia.  As the HDZ was led by members that had been ousted from the LCC during 
the 1971 purge, Serbs within Croatia would begin to rally behind the fear that they would 
be treated as second class citizens as a new era of a Croatian Maspok came into being. 
Although the Croats felt as though their culture and heritage was being subjugated 
to that of the Serbs in the 1970’s, the Serbs in the 1990’s felt the same.  As Croatia began 
to move towards independence in 1990, Serbs living within Croatian borders began to 
fear that they would not be treated as equals should Croatia secede.  As of the 1981 
census, 12.6 percent of those living within Croatian borders were of Serbian nationality 
(slightly more than a half million Serbs) (Andrejevich, Croatia Between Stability and 
Civil War (Part I), 1990).  On July 25, 1990, thousands of Serbs gathered in the town of 
Srb to protest their exclusion from the new Croatian state.  Tudjman responded during the 
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inauguration ceremony in Zagreb that Croats were “faced with a scenario for 
destabilizing Croatia to provoke military intervention and thereby overturn the 
legitimately elected new government of Croatia,” and alluded to the manipulation of the 
protestors by the Serbian government (Denich, 1994, p. 380). 
In a response to the election result, and to what Serbs within Croatia perceived as 
a security threat, in August of 1990 Serbian activists within Croatia called for a 
referendum to declare Serbian cultural autonomy within Croatia, contending that the 
Serbs had been denied basic freedoms.  The referendum called for the establishment of 
Serbian schools, teaching Serbian history, Cyrillic script, and setting up Serbian 
publishing houses and television stations to serve Serb dominated areas such as Knin, 
Slavonia, Banija, and Kordun (Andrejevich, Croatia Between Stability and Civil War 
(Part I), 1990).  It was not just the fact that Serbs and Croats wanted to be able to 
individually express their own culture, but the referendum was instead a commentary on 
the larger problem that populations between Croatia and Serbia were not homogenous, 
and there was a real fear that with the fall of Yugoslavia minority citizens would not be 
treated equally.  This fear of inequality was exacerbated by elites on both sides.  Jovan 
Raskovic, a Croatian Serb politician, said that Tudjman was “powerless to create a 
modern, democratic, and free Croatia…because he is restricted by the Ustasha core of the 
HDZ.”  Raskovic also said that “we are against the expanding Ustasha movment.  If we 
feel a danger from the Ustasha movement, we will rally” (Andrejevich, Croatia Between 
Stability and Civil War (Part I), 1990, p. 42).   
 The fear between Serbs in Croatia and Croats was intensified by elite rhetoric that 
exacerbated the already existing security dilemma from both sides.  In response to the 
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Serbian referendum, Croatian leadership, seeking to strengthen its borders, established a 
5,000 member special police force in order to handle special situations in critical zones 
(Serb dominated areas).  Serbs, in response, claimed that this unit was to be feared, as the 
members were either former criminals or emigrants trained abroad by the Ustasha 
(Andrejevich, Croatia Between Stability and Civil War (Part I), 1990).  The need to 
create this police force, as well as the response by Serbs demonstrates a clear progression 
of the security dilemma that was beginning to develop in Croatia.   
 By September 28, 1990, fighting over the control of arms was taking place in the 
Croatian town of Petrinja.  Serbs within the town, fearing for their own security, raided a 
reserve police station stealing the arms within.  When Croatian police responded and took 
back control of the station and confiscated the weapons, Serbs began to protest.  While it 
is unclear as to the specific order of events, it is known that police used teargas and clubs 
on the protesters, and one policeman was seriously injured by return gunfire.  By the end 
of the melee, 27 people had been arrested by police (RFE/RL, 1990).   
 On March 1, 1991, an eerily similar situation took place in the town of Pakrac, 
which is located in the ethnically mixed region of Slavonia.  Once again, fearful Serbs 
disarmed the town’s local Croatian police force and the Croatian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs deployed 150 members of a special anti-riot unit to correct the situation.  The 
federal government immediately stepped in, mobilizing the JNA for the first time since 
1945 to assist in restoring calm to the area (Andrejevich, Crisis in Croatia: The Pakrac 
Drama, 1991).  Naturally, Serb and Croat accounts of what took place differ, but it is 
known that fire was exchanged between the Croatian anti-riot force and the JNA. 
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 As the security dilemma in Croatia intensified, so did the level of violence.  It is 
impossible in the Croatian case to extrapolate the security dilemma and fear without 
addressing the role that elites played in propagating that fear.  The two theories (elite 
manipulation and non-material) are so closely intertwined that they must be viewed 
together.  Prior to late 1989, Croatia had been viewed as the “silent republic,” particularly 
when it came to issues such as the tension between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians.  
Croatian leaders have dismissed this by saying that rather than being open about issues, 
they have been dealing with them quietly, and have also attributed Croatia’s silence to a 
slow recovery from Tito’s 1971 purge that decimated the LCC (Andrejevich, Croatia: 
Reform and Tension, 1990).  Following the 11th LCC Congress in December 1989, and 
continuing throughout the election campaign season of 1990, elites in Croatia became 
increasingly vocal regarding their intentions.  The Croatian daily newspaper Vjesnik 
wrote in March of 1991 that “the forces of democratization are already retreating before 
the forces of neo-Stalinism,” and Vjesnik as well as Danas began reporting on the fear 
that Croats began to experience.  This fear, the papers claim, were based on the Serbian 
push for special rights for Serbs within Croatian borders, and would result in the 
“Kosovization of Croatia” (Andrejevich, Croatia: The "silent" Republic Speaks Out, 
1989, p. 3). 
 The HDZ, which ran a strongly nationalist campaign in order to get elected to the 
Sabor, elected Franjo Tudjman to the State Presidency in 1990.  Once elected, he not only 
focused primarily on the national question, but he also virtually ignored the economy, 
only commenting that “a dinar earned in Croatia would stay there” (Tanner, 1997).  He 
also represented a monumental threat to Serbs living in Croatia, frequently referring to 
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Croatia’s past glories to crowds waving the HDZ flag, which incidentally utilized a red 
and white checkerboard pattern that the Serbs related to the Ustasha’s old flag (Tanner, 
1997).  Following Tudjman’s election, his party immediately composed a new 
constitution, renamed streets and squares to that of historical Croatian figures, created a 
new Croatian news agency, and began to purge the language of words imported from 
Belgrade (Tanner, 1997).  Even the name of the republic had now been changed.  No 
longer would Croatia be the ‘national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the 
Serbian nation in Croatia’, but was now declared as the homeland of the Croatian nation, 
and Serbs were simply a minority within a Croatian state (Tanner, 1997, p. 230).   
The Serbian LCY was renamed as the Socialist Party of Serbia in 1990, and 
Slobodan Milosevic was named its leader.  Dragan Bulatovic, a delegate of the SPS 
delivered a speech in 1990 stating that  he supported “any move toward the unification of 
Serbia and Montenegro”, and said that Tudjman represented “the efficient 
executioners…who 45 years ago had Mussolini and Hitler to help them.  This is 
something the Serbs will never allow again, and we will let Tudjman and Milan Kucan 
know about it” (Andrejevich, Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia, 1990, p. 44).  
Spring 1991 also saw intense rhetoric coming from Vuk Draskovich, a Serbian nationalist 
politician, who said “if war comes, I fear most for the fate of the Croatian people.  There 
isn’t a Serb to whom the Croats don’t owe several liters of blood.  There isn’t a house in 
which someone was massacred” (Denich, 1994, p. 381). 
Bette Denich noted that Serbs within Croatia had legitimate historical grievances 
against Croats due to the overwhelming numbers of death that was experiences at the 
hands of the Ustasha during WWII.  However, she also noted that Serbs living within 
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Serbia had very little to hold against their Croatian counterparts, as the majority of deaths 
within Serbian borders were not at the hands of the Ustasha but rather the Germans 
(Denich, 1994).  Serb leadership however was able to mobilize and get Serbs throughout 
Yugoslavia to come together against the Serbs by using images of newly uncovered mass 
graves that had been hidden since WWII.  Ceremonies for the lost began to increase in 
tempo as Serbs within Bosnia and Croatia began to exhume these mass graves and to 
conduct proper mass burials.  These ceremonies were covered in depth by Serbian media, 
detailing gruesome details, personal memoirs, and historical sources al aimed at inciting 
anger towards the new Croatian government that was so readily utilizing symbols from 
the Ustasha state (Denich, 1994). 
It has been noted that the Serb leadership made a conscious decision to create a 
Yugoslavia that did not include the Slovenes or the Croats.  Borisav Jovic, a close ally of 
Milosevic, noted in his diary on June 28, 1990 that Milosevic had discussed with him 
how to create a new Yugoslavia without the Slovene and Croatian republics, plus Serb 
dominated areas such as Lika, Banija and Kordun.  Jovic wrote that these regions within 
Croatia should “decide in a referendum whether they wanted to stay or leave” Croatia’s 
new state, and that Slovenia and Croatia should not have a say in the matter (Judah, 2000, 
p. 169).  Milosevic additionally knew that in order to remove Croatia from the picture, 
Serbs within Croatia would have to be armed.  A network was developed which utilized 
stocks of police weapons as well as arms from the Territorial Defense Units and the JNA.  
Serbs in Knin, now armed, began what would be known as the Log Revolution.  Utilizing 
logs, Serbs created road blocks that would keep Croats out of now Serb controlled areas 
(Judah, 2000).  By playing Croatia’s new found nationalistic fervor and turning it into a 
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tool to promote Serbian nationalism and unity, Milosevic and Tudjman had created a 
dangerous situation.   
The conscious decision by Tudjman and other Croatian leaders, as well as 
Milosevic and Serbian leaders to focus their rhetoric on fear, security, and historical 
atrocities was a deadly decision.  Table 11 shows that the combination of intense 
nationalistic rhetoric coupled with non-material factors such as fear, a security dilemma, 
and inter-mixed population scores a rating of very high.  Table 12 shows the causal 
factors that were present in the Croatian case.  A base of economic crisis led again to a 
desire for reform, however in contrast to the Slovenian case, elites ignored the material 
issues and focused almost entirely on the national question.  By doing this, past images of 
the Ustasha were brought back to life, fear and uncertainty about the future caused mass 
hysteria, and violence became completely unavoidable.    As indicated in Table 12, the 
combination of all three factors gve Croatia a rating of Imminent and violence, as 
predicted could not be avoided.  
Table 11.  Croatian Probability for Violence based on Non-Material and Elite 
Manipulation Factors. 
Causal Factor Level  Examples Effect 
    
Non-Material Very High Intermixed Populations, 
Referendum for Cultural 
Autonomy, Security 
Dilemma, Past Atrocities  
Fear Between 
Neighbors was 
Created, Conflict 
over Disputed 
Regions 
Elite Manipulation Very High Intense Rhetoric, 
Tudjman’s Focus on 
Croatian State, 
Describing Competeing 
Ethnic Groups as 
Dangerous 
Extreme Fear, 
Localized Arming, 
Ethnic Violence 
Probability Very High   
62 
 
 
 
Table 12.  Causal factors in Croatian case. 
Causal Factor Level  Example Effect 
    
Material Moderate Underdeveloped Fund, 
Development Levels 
Issues were present, 
but not prioritized 
Non-Material Very High Fight for Control of 
Forces, Intermixed 
Populations, Serbian Fear 
of Inequality 
Issue was 
prioritized and 
became highly 
volatile 
Elite Manipulation Very High Croatian Nationalism, 
Serbian Nationalism, 
Playing up Fear and 
Security 
Extreme Violence 
Overall Imminent Genocide, Violence Eventual 
Independence, 
Poor International 
Standing 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 - Conclusion 
 While there may be no perfect system for determining the probability of collective 
violence one-hundred percent accurately, I have shown that it is possible to develop a 
system that takes into account aspects from many different theories.  Many researchers 
have undertaken the task of studying collective violence and trying to understand why it 
happens.  However, in this effort, many theories have been proposed that explain 
individual test cases, but cannot be broadly applied.  Through this study, I have taken the 
positive aspects of various theories in order to develop a model that can be applied to 
many cases.  My theory is able to be widely used in a variety of cases due to the fact that 
my model was developed to be intentionally loose.  By this I mean that there is some 
room left in my model to allow for scholarly interpretations of individual cases while still 
utilizing Toft’s categorizations to cover all possible incidents. 
While each new case will present different challenges than my test cases of 
Slovenia and Croatia, the model has been developed with enough broad applicability to 
account for these challenges.  We can see that economic issues, while important to many 
groups, will rarely lead to violence on their own.  Simply adding elites who desire reform 
may increase the probability for violence, but does not always lead to violence.  The 
individual researcher will have to determine what type of rhetoric the elites are using, as 
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well as how it will affect the probability for violence.  Those elites playing off of security 
based concerns will have a greater effect on the probability of violence as emotions such 
as fear are much more readily manipulated.     
 Material based theories have shown that the divergence between reality and 
expectations can cause concern amongst members of a group, whether it be the 
economically advantaged or disadvantaged group.  This material concern typically will 
motivate a group to act, although not typically violently.  Material based concerns usually 
will provide a catalyst and platform for reform, and the desire for reform will typically 
cause the group to seek a leader to represent them.  Depending on the elite, and how they 
push for reform will have a significant effect on the probability for violence. 
 Non-material concerns on the other hand, have the potential to create a much 
more volatile situation.  In and of themselves, they represent the potential for violence, 
but without the assistance of elites to manipulate the situation it is less likely.  A situation 
where a group’s security has been compromised creates fear and anxiety.  These 
emotions are a powerful tool that elites can quickly exploit and utilize to motivate groups 
into violent action.  The addition of serious emotional factors to non-material concerns 
makes them much more prone to violence than non-material, but this is generally not 
realized until the addition of elite manipulation occurs. 
 The role of an elite acts as an amplifying factor in determining the probability for 
violence.  Without a material or non-material based concern to exploit, it would be 
exceedingly difficult for an elite alone to manipulate groups into action.  The base issue 
also plays a significant role in selecting the elite that will be able to rise to power.  In 
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Slovenia for example, the economy (material concern) was the issue of the day.  In the 
end, the citizens sought a leader that would fix the issue in a moderate way, and 
intentionally avoided electing the leader that was far more radical and posed more 
danger.  In Croatia however, populations were much more intermixed, and security was a 
much larger concern.  In this situation, the people turned not to the leader who wanted to 
repair the economy, but to the leaders who promised to protect them.  This decision 
turned out to be a deadly one. 
 It is irresponsible to try and blame only elite manipulation or the security dilemma 
for causing collective violence.  For each case, there will undoubtedly be a variety of 
causal factors that lead to collective violence.  However, elites do play a pivotal role in 
the likelihood of violence.  Depending on the issue they choose as their platform for 
power, they essentially act as the linchpin of the equation.  The base factor, whether it be 
material in nature or non-material, can be greatly exacerbated by a charismatic and 
effective manipulator. 
 One issue that I did not directly address in this work was that of the opposing 
group.  In my definition of collective violence, I noted that there must be a conflict 
between two opposing groups.  Throughout this work, I touched briefly on the role of 
Serbia without directly attributing their role to the probability of violence.  My intent for 
the scope of this project however, is to determine the probability of violence for only one 
group.  This probability naturally relies on the relationship between the two groups; for 
example, Yugoslavia’s role in the Slovene case stayed mainly on the material side as 
well.  Their inability to work out a solution with Slovenia caused Slovene leaders to 
eventually declare independence.  In the Croatian case, intense rhetoric on both sides 
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caused a much higher probability for violence.  When examining any case however, both 
sides really need to be thoroughly analyzed.  If one group feels threatened, and takes 
action to strengthen themselves, then the opposing group may feel threatened as a by-
product.  Two groups who are both threatened by the other can almost have an 
exponential type effect on the probability of violence. 
 Another potentially problematic area in using Slovenia and Croatia as my case 
studies is the role of ethnicity.  While I did touch upon the effect of intermixed 
populations briefly in the Non-Material analysis, I did not address the role of the 
opposing group in this situation.  Particularly for the Croatian case, Serbs in Serbia and 
Croatian Serbs do not contribute to the probability for violence in the same manner.  It is 
important to note that Serbs living within Serbian borders did not actually play a very 
large role in the violence, outside of tacit support for their brethren in Croatia.  The 
majority of violence was in fact carried out by those living within the Croatian border and 
the JNA.  Additionally, elites within Serbian borders used rhetoric to mobilize the 
Croatian Serbs, despite the fact that those elites were not living under the intense 
conditions that were created in these intermixed regions.  For the scope of this project, I 
have still been able to show that in order to determine the probability of violence, you 
must take into account Material, Non-Material, and Elite Manipulation factors.  However, 
when applying this model to a new case that has not yet experienced violence, the role of 
intermixed populations should be more closely examined, just as the role of the opposing 
group must be. 
While my model does provide a method to predict collective violence in 
transitioning states, it is imperative to individually examine each case.  Even a score of 
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Unlikely leaves open the possibility of violence, even if it is a small one.  When 
researchers and politicians should become concerned is when different causal factors 
begin to interact, particularly in a case where a security dilemma is created and there is 
the potential for elites to exploit the group’s fears.  It is my hope that this concept can be 
developed further in the future and become an effective tool to be used by the 
international community in order to identify potential hot-spots before they occur.  With 
the proper foresight, there should be no reason for another catastrophe such as 
Yugoslavia to occur again. 
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